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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Chris Wayne Lawrence appeals, challenging the district court's order denying his 
motion to suppress, the sentence imposed upon his conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with a persistence violator enhancement, and the district court's 
order denying his Rule 35 motion as it related to the calculation of his credit for time 
served. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
On the evening of August 20th, while getting a ride home on the back of a 
motorcycle, Lawrence dropped his wallet into the street. (Tr., p.21, Ls.16-21.) The 
driver of the motorcycle pulled over and he and Lawrence searched for the wallet along 
the side of the road. (Id.) A police officer, performing his community caretaking 
function, made contact with the two men and requested the assistance of Officer 
Putman in locating the wallet. (Tr., p.8, Ls.13-25; p.21, Ls.22-25.) Officer Putnam 
found the wallet lying in the middle of the street and brought it back to Lawrence. (Id.) 
At this time, Officer Putnam asked Lawrence if he was carrying anything illegal. 
(State's Ex. 1; Tr., p.10, Ls.15-19.) Lawrence said he was not. (Id.) The officer 
requested permission to search him, and Lawrence consented to the search. (Id.) 
During the search, Officer Putnam felt a small square plastic container, asked and 
received permission to remove it, and removed it. (State's Ex. 1; Tr., p.11, Ls.1-1 O; 
p.24, L.21 - p.25, L 13.) The container held a small quantity of marijuana. (State's Ex. 
1; R., p.5.) Officer Putnam placed Lawrence under arrest and then searched through 
the rest of his pockets, locating a small quantity of methamphetamine. (Id.) 
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The State charged Lawrence with possession of a controlled substance with a 
persistent narcotics violator enhancement. (R., pp.14-17.) Lawrence filed a motion to 
suppress the narcotics evidence, challenging the lawfulness of the initial search and 
seizure. (R., pp.19-22.) The State objected to the motion (R., pp.33-36), and it went to 
an evidentiary hearing (R., pp.37-42). The district court denied the motion to suppress. 
(R., p.49; Tr., p.25, Ls.5-18.) Lawrence entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his 
right to challenge the denial of his suppression motion. (Tr., p.26, L.9 - p.27, L.3; p.42, 
L.18 - p.43, L.20.) 
The district court entered judgment of conviction on the possession charge with 
the persistent narcotics violator enhancement, and sentenced Lawrence to a unified 
term of confinement of eight years with two years fixed, giving credit for 159 days 
served. (R., pp.51-52.) Lawrence filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.55-56.) 
Lawrence also filed a timely Rule 35 motion to reconsider sentence, requesting, inter 
alia, that the district court correct its calculation of time served. (R., pp.53-54.) The 
district court denied the Rule 35 motion. (Order Denying Criminal Rule 35 
(Augmentation).) 
2 
ISSUES 
Lawrence states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress 
when it failed to address whether Mr. Lawrence revoked consent to 
search. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it executed an 
excessive sentence. 
3. Whether the district court erred when it failed to grant the proper 
credit for time served. 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The State rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Lawrence failed to establish error in the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress? 
2. Has Lawrence failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in 
imposing a unified sentence of eight years with two years fixed upon Lawrence's 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance as a persistent narcotics violator? 
3. Was Lawrence given credit for all the time he served in custody while awaiting 
the entry of judgment? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court, upon Finding that Lawrence Consented to the Search of his Person, 
Correctly Denied his Motion to Suppress 
A. Introduction 
The district court found that Lawrence consented to the search of his person. 
{Tr., p.25, Ls.5-13.) Lawrence does not dispute the district court's finding that Lawrence 
consented to being searched. {Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) Lawrence, however, asserts 
that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, arguing that Lawrence 
revoked his consent to be searched. {Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) Lawrence has failed to 
establish clear error in the district court's finding of fact that Lawrence did not revoke 
consent. The district court's denial of his suppression motion should be affirmed. 
B. Standard of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises 
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have 
been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 
P.3d 91, 94-95 {2009); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561,916 P.2d 1284, 1286 {Ct. 
App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the 
trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 {1995); State 
v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 {Ct. App. 1999). 
Whether consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact, the 
determination of which is reviewed on appeal for clear error. State v. Reynolds, 146 
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Idaho 466, 472, 197 P.3d 327, 333 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 
648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008). 
C. Lawrence has Failed to Establish Error in the District Court's Finding of Consent 
A warrantless search conducted pursuant to valid consent does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations 
omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); State v. 
Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001 ). Consent is valid if given freely and 
voluntarily. Bustamente, 412 U.S. at 225-26 (citations omitted). The voluntariness of 
an individual's consent is a question of fact to be determined based upon the totality of 
the circumstances. Varie, 135 Idaho at 852, 26 P.3d at 35 (citing Bustamente, 412 U.S. 
at 248-49). In order to be valid, consent cannot be the result of duress or coercion, 
either direct or implied. Bustamente, 412 U.S. at 248. The mere presence of officers 
asking for consent to search is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute improper 
police duress or coercion. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Instead, 
the court must consider all of the surrounding circumstances and find consent 
involuntary only if "coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim 
of lawful authority .... " State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 158, 657 P.2d 17, 22 (1983) 
(emphasis original) (quoting Bustamente, 412 U.S. at 233). 
Applying the correct legal standards, the district court found that Lawrence 
consented to the search. (Tr., p.23, L.11 - p.25, L.13.) That finding is amply supported 
by the record. At the hearing, Officer Putnam testified that he asked Lawrence if he had 
anything illegal in his pockets and if he could search him. (Tr., p.9, Ls.3-11; p.10, Ls.15-
19.) Lawrence put up his hands and said "go ahead." (Tr., p.9, Ls.12-14; p.10, Ls.17-
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19.) After receiving Lawrence's freely and voluntarily given consent, Officer Putnam 
searched Lawrence, whereupon he felt a small square plastic container through the 
fabric of Lawrence's pocket. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-10.) Officer Putnam requested permission 
to remove the container, and Lawrence responded, "Yeah, what is it?" (Id.) Officer 
Putnam removed the items from Lawrence's pocket without any objection. (Tr., p.14, 
Ls.14-17.) 
At the hearing, the State presented a recording of the encounter, which the 
district court also viewed. As noted in Lawrence's brief, that video showed the following 
exchange: 
Officer Putnam: What about you sir? 
Lawrence: Uh, I got a couple cans of beer in my pockets. 
Officer Putnam: In your pocket? You got anything else illegal on you? 
Lawrence: No. 
Officer Putnam: Nothing? 
Lawrence: No. 
Officer Putnam: Mind if we check? 
Lawrence: My pockets are full. 
Officer Putnam: OK. Mind if I check -
Lawrence: [raising hands in the air] Go ahead. 
Officer Putnam: -- make sure you don't have anything illegal on you? Put 
your hands on top of your head. [Officer Putnam proceeds to search 
Lawrence, removing items from his pockets, as Lawrence chats about 
people splashing water at his cousin's house.] What's this in here? 
What's this? Can I take it out? This little square thing? Do you mind if I 
take it out and see what it is? 
Lawrence: Well, yeah, what is it? 
Officer Putnam: [removing the plastic container] I'm asking you. 
(State's Ex. 1.) Viewing the video, it becomes apparent that Lawrence freely and 
voluntarily consented to the search, as found by the district court. 
On appeal, Lawrence does not dispute the district court's finding of fact that he 
initially consented to the search. (Appellant's brief, p.5.) Rather, Lawrence argues that 
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he revoked his consent before the officer removed the narcotics from his pocket. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) Lawrence's assertion is neither supported by applicable legal 
standards nor the record, and he has failed to show clear error in the district court's 
findings of fact. 
Consent, freely and voluntarily given, may be revoked, thereby terminating the 
authority of the police to continue the warrantless search. State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 
693, 696, 978 P.2d 881, 884 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 560, 
716 P.2d 1328, 1332 (Ct. App. 1986). When the basis for a search is consent, the 
government must conform to the limitations placed upon the right granted to search. kl_ 
The standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is that 
of objective reasonableness, i.e., "what would the typical reasonable person have 
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect." Florida v. Jimeno, 
500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991); State v. Frizzel, 132 Idaho 522, 523, 975 P.2d 1187, 1188 
(Ct. App. 1999). 
"Effective withdrawal of consent requires unequivocal conduct, in the form of 
either an act, statement, or some combination of the two, that is inconsistent with the 
consent to the search previously given." Burton v. United States, 657 A.2d 741, 748 
(D.C. Cir. 1994). This is because equivocal conduct can be construed in many different 
ways and, therefore, does not pass muster under an objective reasonableness test. kl_; 
accord United States v. Alfaro, 935 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1991 ); Nebraska v. French, 279 
N.W.2d 116, 119-120 (Neb. 1979); Lawrence v. Virginia, 435 S.E.2d 591, 595 (Va. 
1993); see also United States v. Ross, 263 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2001) (defendant's 
impatience during the search of his car, questions how much longer the search would 
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last, and statement that he needed to be on his way did not amount to an "unequivocal 
act or statement of withdrawal of consent."); United States v. Brown, 884 F.2d 1309, 
1311-12 (9th Cir. 1989) (having consented to a search of his luggage, defendant's 
question to police officers at the airport: "Do I have to go?" did not withdraw his 
unambiguous statement of consent); United States v. Joseph, 892 F.2d 118, 122 (1989) 
(reaching into bag and saying "[d]o we have to do this here? ... I have underwear and 
things in the bag," did not constitute effective withdrawal when defendant then 
accompanied officers to a more secluded area for the completion of the search.) 
Lawrence argues that his answer, "Well, yeah, what is it?" during the search of 
his pocket only referred back to Officer Putnam's question, "Do you mind if I take it out 
and see what it is?" (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) But Lawrence was responding to a 
series of questions with his answer, "yeah." As noted above, upon detecting the plastic 
container of marijuana, the officer asked, "What's t~1is in here? What's this? Can I take 
it out? This little square thing? Do you mind if I take it out and see what it is?" (State's 
Ex. 1) On the page, it is not clear to which of these questions Lawrence was 
responding when he answered, "yeah, what is it?" Determining which question was 
being responded to is an issue of fact for the district court. The district court found that 
Lawrence's response meant "yes, go through my pockets and tell me what it is." (Tr., 
p.24, Ls.21-23.) That interpretation is clearly supported by the video of the encounter. 
(See State's Ex. 1.) Lawrence has therefore failed to show clear error in the district 
court's factual finding. 
Lawrence further argues that the issue of consent revocation was not addressed 
below. (Appellant's brief, p.7.) This claim is not supported by the record. The question 
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of whether Lawrence's response of "yeah, what is it?" constituted continuing consent or 
revocation of consent was put squarely before the district court. The prosecutor argued 
that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Lawrence's statement was clearly an 
expression of consent. (Tr., p.16, L.18 - p.17, L.1; p.20, L.11 - p.21, L.4.) Defense 
counsel argued that the statement was not an expression of consent, but was 
revocation of consent. (Tr., p.17, L.14 - p.19, L.12.) The district court squarely 
addressed the conflicting interpretations of Lawrence's statement and found that it was 
an expression of consent. (Tr., p.22, L.18 - p.25, L.18.) Lawrence has failed to show 
clear error in that finding of fact. 
The district court found that the State met its burden in showing that Lawrence 
freely and voluntarily consented to the full search, including the removal of the drugs 
from his pocket. (Tr., p.25, Ls.5-13.) Lawrence has failed to show clear error in the 
factual finding that he freely and voluntarily consented to the search. The district court's 
denial of Lawrence's suppression motion should therefore be affirmed. 
II. 
Lawrence has Failed to Establish an Abuse of Discretion by the Sentencing Court 
Lawrence asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and 
executed a unified sentence of eight years with two years fixed following his conviction 
for possession of a controlled substance with a persistent narcotics violator 
enhancement, in light of his history of substance abuse and other allegedly mitigating 
factors. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-9.) Lawrence has failed to establish an abuse of 
sentencing discretion by the district court. 
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Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish 
that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 
P .3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To 
carry this burden, the appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence of 
confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is 
necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any 
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given 
case." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Though courts review the whole sentence on appeal, the presumption is that the fixed 
portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. 
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In deference to the trial judge, 
the Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds 
might differ. Too hill, 103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at 710. 
The record provides ample support for the relatively lenient sentence imposed by 
the district court. Lawrence has been engaged in criminal acts for decades. He 
possessed marijuana and methamphetamine in this case. (PSI, pp.1-3.) Lawrence 
disputed knowing that he was in possession of methamphetamine (PSI, p.3), but this 
claim is significantly belied by Lawrence's admitting to the police that the substance 
they found him carrying was methamphetamine before the police conducted the drug 
test and confirmed the substance's identity (see State's Ex. 1; R., p.5; PSI, p.2). 
Lawrence's unwilllngness to take full responsibility for his crime raises serious concerns 
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regarding his potential to successfully rehabilitate and overcome his substance abuse 
addictions. 
Lawrence's pattern of criminality is evidenced by his lengthy criminal history, 
which includes several felonies and misdemeanors and dates back to 1988. (PSI, pp.3-
10.) Throughout the last two decades and change, Lawrence only managed to remain 
crime free for one substantial period during the four years between late 1997 and 2001. 
(Id.) Many of his crimes, like the present ones, involve substance abuse directly. (Id.) 
However, he has also been charged with violent crimes, theft crimes, and weapons-
related offenses. (Id.) 
As Lawrence notes on appeal, he also has a lengthy history of substance abuse. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) In the present case, Lawrence was convicted of being a 
persistence narcotics violator. (R., pp.51-52.) Lawrence's substance abuse problems 
began at age 8 with alcohol, then progressed to marijuana at 13, LSD at 18, 
methamphetamine and cocaine at 19, and prescription medication abuse. (PSI. pp.16-
17.) Lawrence has participated in treatment, such as alcoholics anonymous, but has 
been unsuccessful. (PSI, pp.16-17.) Examples of this include his having consumed, by 
his own account, somewhere between eleven and thirteen beers on the night of the 
present crime. (PSI, pp.2-3.) Lawrence argues that this history of substance abuse 
should be weighed as a mitigating factor. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) It was. (See, Tr., 
p.54, L.18 - p.55, L.4; p.67, L.14 - p.70, L.12.) Lawrence's continued violation of the 
law after extensive time and programming shows that Lawrence is either unwilling or 
unable to change his behavior without substantial intervention, which is what the district 
court's sentence allows. 
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Lawrence has had several opportunities on Riders and probation to break his 
pattern of criminality and overcome his substance abuse addictions. (PSI, pp.10-11.) 
He has failed. A term of imprisonment properly addresses the objectives of sentencing. 
It provides for the primary objective of protecting society by removing Lawrence from 
the public for at least two years. In conjunction with the therapeutic community, the 
sentence also allows Lawrence a meaningful opportunity for rehabilitation, which was 
the goal of all the parties at sentencing. (See, Tr., p.54, L.18 - p.55, L.4; p.68, Ls.10-
14; p.68, L.15 - p.70, L.12.) Lawrence has failed to establish that the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion. The district court's sentence is reasonable, and 
should be affirmed on appeal. 
111. 
The District Court Erred in Calculating Lawrence's Credit for Time Served 
By statute, courts are required to give convicted defendants "credit in the 
judgment for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration 
was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered." I.C. § 
18-309. Lawrence was taken into custody for possession of a controlled substance on 
August 20, 2010. (R., pp.4-6.) Review of the record shows that Lawrence remained in 
custody throughout his arraignments and hearings until being sentenced. (See R., 
pp. 9-13, 18, 37-42, 45-48.) The district court entered judgment against Lawrence on 
February 16, 2011. (R., pp.51-52.) The intervening time between August 20, 2010 and 
February 16, 2011 is 180 days. The district court awarded credit for 159 days served. 
(R., p.52.) The district court therefore erred in denying Lawrence's Rule 35 motion as it 
related to his request for the district court to correct its calculation of credit for time 
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served. Lawrence should be granted 21 additional days credit for time served while 
awaiting judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Lawrence's motion to suppress evidence; affirm Lawrence's sentence; but 
credit Lawrence for 180 days time served. 
DA TED this 11th day of October, 2011. 
RUSS L .SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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